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Social dynamics in migration choices and attitudes
Two main empirical puzzles challenge recent migra-
tion research in economics. First, the observation of
large differences in migration behaviour among re-
gions or communities in the absence of correspond-
ing differences in economic fundamentals. Second,
the discrepancy between the modest economic im-
pacts of migration and the strong public opposition
to increased immigration observed in most receiving
countries. In both cases, there is a substantial varia-
tion in either individual choices or individual atti-
tudes which remain unaccounted for in standard
neoclassical models.
Examples of prima facie evidence defying the stan-
dard economic theory include, for instance, the ab-
sence of migration despite persistent income gaps;or
the presence of substantial flows in the absence of,or
even in contradiction to, economic discrepancies be-
tween origin and destination. Economic explana-
tions of immigration policy attitudes are also often
inconsistent with empirical findings which suggest,
e.g., that some groups tend to express more positive
views on immigration (like Hispanic and black mi-
nority members in the US) despite predictions of
being precisely the most affected by labour market
competition.
New theoretical and empirical approaches try to ac-
commodate such puzzles using models that incorpo-
rate social interactions. This means imposing poten-
tial externalities of migration both on the receiving
country’s population and migrants themselves.
Individual decisions depend therefore on the choic-
es made by the members of a reference group and
externalities across individuals determine the popu-
lation-wide behaviour and formation of attitudes.
The main assumption therefore is that migration
decisions are not taken by an individual in isolation.
Using Manski’s (2000) classification, they are influ-
enced by the actual or intentional migration choices
in one’s peer group (endogenous effects) or by the
group’s specific characteristics (contextual effects).
Historically,there has been little explicit modelling of
these types of externalities in migration (migrant net-
works, peer influences, immigrant clusters, herd be-
haviour, chain migration). Recent contributions show
however – both theoretically (e.g.,Epstein 2008;2010)
and empirically (e.g., Epstein and Gang 2006) – that
social dynamics have a significant impact on the mi-
grants’ decisions when and where to migrate and on
their labour market assimilation at destination
(Bauer et al. 2005; Munshi 2003).
A recent complementary line of research applies a
broader class of externalities to explain individual
attitudes towards immigration policy. Recognising
that immigration does not only have labour market
and fiscal effects but changes also the composition of
the local population, Card et al. (2011) look at how
concerns about compositional amenities, associated
with neighbourhood characteristics, affect the views
on immigration. They find these to be substantially
more important than economic concerns.
The economic intuition behind these two puzzling
relationships (small flows despite large differentials
and strong attitudes despite negligible effects) helps
to uncover important aspects of the interaction be-
tween migration networks and migration policy out-
comes. The rest of this article will present some re-
cent evidence on the social dynamics of migration
and how these affect migrants’ choices and attitudes
as well as the impact of migration at origin and des-
tination. We argue first that network effects and so-
cial interactions were gradually incorporated in mi-
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gration models, starting with the traditional Harris-
Todaro framework and ending with the dynamic fea-
tures of search-theoretic models.We then briefly dis-
cuss research showing how network effects interact
with migration policies beyond the regulation and
selection mechanisms. How do networks impact on
the labour market outcomes and welfare attitudes of
migrants? Do ethnic networks explain some of the
observed complementarity in trade and factor flows?
Are networks relevant for understanding the conse-
quences of policies towards refugees and asylum
seekers? Will the presence of migrant networks lead
to different effects of enforcement? Can networks
render migration policy intervention ineffective?
Social interactions in migration decisions: the 
traditional view
In standard economic analysis, migration decisions
are explained as the result of an individual cost-ben-
efit calculation: a forward-looking migrant seeks to
maximise expected well-being over a time horizon
by means of relocation. Individual rational actors
decide to migrate if their expected discounted net
returns from moving to an alternative international
location are positive.The decision is thus possibly af-
fected by both pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects,
and by the likelihood of unemployment (Harris and
Todaro 1970).Even this standard human capital mo-
del of migration can be augmented by postulating
that the migration decision-making entity is not the
migrant in isolation (for reviews, see Boyd 1989 and
Radu 2008). Migration decisions can be instead the
result of a joint process involving the migrant and
some group of non-migrants (within families or house-
holds). Decisions to migrate are motivated by status
comparisons like the individual ranking in the wage
distribution at home and in the destination country
(de Coulon and Wadsworth 2010). Indian migrants
experience, e.g., a significant fall in the wage distrib-
ution when they migrate to the UK and the US,com-
pared to what they would achieve had they remained
at home. This could explain the relative low migra-
tion rate of India-
Endogenising migration costs
A more dynamic perspective on migration, whicho-
riginated in the mid-1970s, increasingly addressed
the structure of information about foreign locations
available to prospective migrants. It emphasised the
search process by which migrants acquire information
about conditions at destination and about the costs of
moving. Using the search process, models in this vein
were the first to link the heterogeneity of migration
flows to the structure of information networks. Fol-
lowing the “friends and relatives effects”advanced by
Greenwood (1969) various mechanisms were conse-
quently proposed for the dissemination of informa-
tion regarding migrants’ potential destinations (which
were originally specified in migrants’ utility functions,
i.e. essentially wages and unemployment, but also
mean and variance of wages and the demand condi-
tions). Similarly, Carrington, Detragiache and Vish-
wanath (1996) use a dynamic model in which migra-
tion costs endogenously decline with the stock of
migrants already settled at destination. This helps
explain the timing (with endogenous moving costs mi-
gration occurs gradually over time) and the patterns
(flows can increase even with simultaneously narrow-
ing income differentials) of migration flows, which
could not have been explained in traditional Harris-
Todaro models.
Dynamic migration models incorporate basically two
rather simple concepts into the economic modelling
of migration decisions: that of migration networks
and, more generically, that of cumulative causation.
The role of migration networks is revealed in the
search-theoretic framework as a mechanism for de-
creasing the costs and risks of migration under imper-
fect information.The economic counterpart of cumu-
lative causation is introduced by the dynamic search:
each step in the search process alters the motivation
and information constraints of potential migrants.
Realised migrations modify in turn the characteristics
in the corresponding locations (in terms of, for exam-
ple, income, wealth, population, or land distribution).
Ethnic networks, trade and capital flows
Some insights with potentially important political
implications for both origin and destination coun-
tries result from the observed simultaneous growth
in trade, FDI, and migration flows.The concomitant
rise in goods and factor flows is in contrast with the
predictions of the standard neoclassical theory.Trade
theory regards migration and trade as substitutes
since both contribute to factor price equalisation.Si-
milarly, capital is expected to flow where labour is
abundant and thus to lower the incentive to migrate.
There is however plenty of evidence to suggest that
migrant networks facilitate in fact bilateral econom-ic transactions, leading to significant trade creation
effects (Gould 1994; Head and Ries 1998; Rauch and
Trindade 2002; Peri and Requena 2009) and an in-
crease in bilateral FDI flows from host to home
countries of migrants (Javorcik et al. 2011). A large
part of the FDI flows to China are handled by the
Chinese diaspora (The Economist 2011). The funda-
mental intuition is that ethnic networks help in re-
ducing the information costs and overcoming con-
tract enforcement difficulties in cross-border transac-
tions. Both the trade-creation effect and the impact
of migrant networks on FDI flows have been largely
neglected in the debates around migration policy.
In addition, cross-border network ties in migrant
communities appear to act as entrepreneurial spring-
boards both in the destination and the home country.
Diaspora networks promote the transfer of knowl-
edge and technology,and boost innovation (Naghavi
and Strozzi 2011; Agrawal et al. 2011) and invest-
ment (Woodruff and Zeneto 2007) in the sending
countries.
Enclaves, labour market outcomes and welfare 
attitudes
The role of ethnic enclaves and migrant networks for
migrants’ labour market outcomes, human capital ac-
cumulation and welfare persistence in the host country
is more difficult to uncover and identify properly.How-
ever, substantive evidence suggests that migrants help
friends and relatives get jobs in the destination coun-
tries. Exogenously larger networks increase the proba-
bility of employment in higher paying jobs, e.g., for
Mexican migrants in the US (Munshi 2003) or refugees
in Denmark (Damm 2009). Job search networks help
migrants from a particular group earn higher wages in
firms with larger shares of employees from the same
ethnic group. Such firms also display higher retention
rates for migrants of similar ethnic origin compared to
majority workers or workers from other groups (Dust-
mann et al.2011).Race,ethnicity and immigrant status
of hiring managers affect the racial composition of new
hires,and separations are more frequent when workers
and managers have dissimilar origins (Åslund et al.
2009; Giuliano et al. 2009).
However, social interactions inside ethnic networks
or communities might also have adverse effects on
the schooling outcomes of second generation immi-
grants.Conditional on the schooling system,negative
migrant-to-migrant peer effects explain the persis-
tence of educational inequality and the considerable
disadvantage of immigrants which is not due to indi-
vidual heterogeneity (Entorf and Lauk 2008).These
ethnic externalities – in the presence of “good or
bad” neighbourhoods – have a strong influence on
the intergenerational mobility of migrants and eth-
nic minorities (Borjas 1992; 1995)
Similarly, social networks inside ethnic minority
groups can favour the emergence of “welfare cul-
tures” (Bertrand et al. 2000; Bratsberg et al. 2010;
Andrén 2007; Riphan 2004). There are two main
channels through which migrant networks can influ-
ence individual choices towards welfare: through
sharing information about welfare provisions inside
minority language communities (information chan-
nel) and through established social norms inside par-
ticular ethnic groups, which in turn determine indi-
vidual and group attitudes.
Asylum flows and social networks: the reluctant
front door
Despite an ongoing cross-disciplinary debate, social
networks have been identified as an important influ-
encing factor throughout the asylum cycle: from the
opportunity to migrate, to decisions over routes and
destinations, and the adaptation in the host society
(Koser 1997; Boswell and Crisp 2004). However, so-
cial networks of which refugees are part do not usu-
ally consist solely of refugees but incorporate a vari-
ety of migrant categories. From this perspective, fo-
cusing on networks can shed light on the dynamics of
asylum flows which would remain otherwise ne-
glected. It might explain why policies restricting the
flow of refugees and asylum seekers account for only
a third of the reduced flow observed since 2001
(Hatton 2009). Thus, there is a growing consensus
that treating asylum seekers and refugees as a sepa-
rate case from “voluntary” immigrants is misguided.
Networks and illegal migrants: the rational back
door
More generally, networks can also be part of a pro-
cess to circumvent restrictive or highly selective mi-
gration policies. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that
any restrictions can or even rationally intend (Entorf
2002; Hanson 2007) to totally prevent illegal migra-
tion. Networks play an important role for the entry
and informal employment opportunities of illegal
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migrants.The use of informal job networks helps ille-
gal immigrants from Mexico, for example, integrate
into the US labour market.
However, in many instances network ties also make
a large fraction of irregular migrants more likely to
use smugglers. Networks can encourage “debt-
financed migration”. Smugglers in the network are
sometimes paid only after the successful passage of
migrants into the host country has been achieved
(Gathman 2008). However, smugglers often tax the
migrants’ income earned in the host country in order
to recoup their “debt-financed migration” (Friebel
and Guriev 2006). In such cases smugglers become
human traffickers (UN 2000) as their role goes be-
yond the help provided for a move across borders.
Endogenising migration policy: the immigration
multiplier
In a very simplified version, migration policies are
viewed as regulation mechanisms operating on an exo-
genously-determined demand for immigration. Mi-
gration choices are thus explained by factors which are
independent of migration policies. However, starting
with the early debate on the “immigration multipli-
er” (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1989), it has been recog-
nised that networks and the social dynamics of
migration flows are important factors for explaining
unintended consequences of migration policies.Any
change in migration policies can be expected to have
behavioural responses over time, the strength of
which will be correlated with the presence and inten-
sity of social networks.
Due to the lack of data, there are only limited op-
tions to test these implications. Recent changes in
migration policies with a “quasi-experimental” char-
acter (e.g.,regularisation programmes or the EU en-
largements) can provide some insights. Elrick and
Ciobanu (2009) use such a context to show how net-
works mediate the impact of migration policies in
Spain.While networks help migrants circumvent re-
strictive policies, depending on their intensity and
size, community networks seem to either foster or
impede the take-up of permissive policies.
Conclusions
Social networks provide in many instances a better
explanation for the timing, selection and destination
choices of migrants. A “networks lens” can also un-
derscore the limited possibilities to predict the im-
pacts of migration policy changes on migration flows.
The policy implications of this empirical evidence
are multilayered and important.They do not concern
only the unintended consequences and the limited
scope of regulating migration through restrictive
policies.The design of any intervention targeting the
labour market participation, the take-up of welfare
programmes or the schooling performance of ethnic
minority members might greatly underestimate the
impact of policy shocks if it ignores the social multi-
plier effects and the human capital externalities aris-
ing inside ethnic communities.
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